geopolitics.over-blog.com

Tunisian revolution has undeniably enhanced interior dynamics as a decisive factor of citizenship restoration. While wars in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed that remodeling the Middle East has just failed because of exterior interventions annihilating popular sovereignty, the Tunisian democratic fervor is undoubtedly the result of the national consciousness and the realization of reclaims, for which responsibilities are voluntarily taken, consequently to the public opinion’s relevant diagnostic. Self-immolation of Sidi Bouzid martyr was the spark that set on the overwhelming fire, already burning. Explosion of the people, expressing social protest of young graduates marginalized by unemployment has soon lead to larger issues including those of governance, freedom Ideal Type and the heavy consequences of the abuse of power, emphasized by the Establishment corruption.      

Tunisian revolution is not the product of any political organization. It was born thanks to the conjunction of exceptionally linked historical factors in a context of exacerbated antagonisms: unemployment increase among elites reflecting an alarming unbalance between employment and qualifications, a frightening socio-economic crisis because of the establishment of a workforce economy; a consequence of markets openness and the resulting privatization, a fragilisation of Tunisian economy and in particular of its emerging sectors (tourism, textile, etc.) generated by global crisis and deteriorated by customer economy. Sidi Bouzid spark actualized the confrontation between the youth and the power in place.      

The reclamation movement extended to the marginalized regions of the North West then widened to the whole country. Demonstrators exposed the general resentment, in a context of an underestimation of the tragic situation by the authorities. A dynamic and brave civil society stands up willing to establish a democratic regime! Can we truly appreciate the impact of “Jasmine Revolution”? What is the shock wave of the “recovered freedom”, in Tunisia and in the Arab area? The second Arab Economic Summit in Charm el-Cheikh had to include this in its agenda: “The Tunisian revolution is not far from us”, pointed Amr Moussa the Secretary-General of the Arab League in his opening speech on January 19^th, 2011. “What’s happening in Tunisia, he declared, (….), is tightly connected to the issues discussed in this reunion. The Arab citizen has hit such a level of exasperation, unseen so far”.

 On the other hand, the Annan and Sana’a demonstrations, and the great popular movements in Cairo, have usually used slogans of the Tunisian revolution and have even exhibited Tunisian flags.  Emphasizing the contagion effects, the Medias have even evoked “An Arab Spring” (Kiosque TV programme, TV5, January, 30^th 2011). Despite a similarity in the nature of some Arab regimes and the existence of explosive situations (crisis effects, politics paralysis, and republican spirit occultation), the Tunisian specificity is evidence, due to the cumulative effect of promotion factors (outstanding development of education, women emancipation, women participation in the active life, etc.).

Moreover, some countries of the Middle-East are subject to their geostrategic alliance gravity that affects their room to maneuver. While expressing their sympathy towards popular movements, international actors think about the eventual impact on the normalization process with Israel, settled since Camp David. We shall not forget the delineation between modernization thanks to culture and the westernization of everyday life by the markets, in the Arab area. Arab analysts properly consider the requirements of the diversity and of the union constraints. 

Despite these differential situations that might play their parts in an unexpected story, Tunisian revolution constitutes a pivotal event in the Arab World History. Its announcement effect is highlighted through the diagnosis of the Arab tragedy and the public opinion resentments. Has it been internally directed, without regional ambition, without any intention of ideological exportation, the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution offers news horizons. Can we stipulate that it hands the torch down to new generations and that it would mark, thanks to the re-actualization of the Arab geopolitical map, the end of a cycle?               

Pr. Khalifa Chater

Initially planned for June 7th, then postponed to November 21st, the second Summit of the Union for the Mediterranean, had been rescheduled for an undetermined date. The co-presidency and Spain, should have taken note of the absence of a consensus and cancelled the Barcelona Summit ( Monday 15 November). The delay looked, however, unavoidable since the meeting held on November 11 and 12 by high officials in Brussels. A mission of the last minute chance, undertaken on November 12 and 13, by the Spanish special envoy, former Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos, to Tunis, Algiers and Tangiers, could not make a breakthrough  as the context was not conducive to that. A partnership of cooperation and peace could not coexist  with a chronic  state of war that is intended to perpetuate colonization and occupation. Hence, it was out of the question to convene a summit of partnership within the context of rejection of the peace process. The Oslo Agreement had created a favourable environment to establish the Barcelona partnership. The rise of the present perils in the Middle East throws obstacles on the way to a Mediterranean Union. Let us shed light on what is at stake in this situation.

            A problem that should be occulted is that the existence of normal relations, constitutes the requirement sine qua none of a functioning structure for cooperation. Partnership should, in fact, appreciate the  mutual understanding by attempting to close the gaps (if any) between points of views, by identifying projects of dealing with disputes and in priority, those concerning the space. The European operators should realize how much urgent it is for them to act in order to keep things tight in hands and impose the ideal peace sought after. They should, moreover, set out relations that are tributary to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions.

            A global diagnosis should, on the other hand, admit that the Mediterranean Union which ought to have taken on the relay of the Barcelona process and to update the Euro-Mediterranean partnership which it could not implement. Nevertheless, it has not succeeded to get involved in the realities of the subject matter as an institution under the control of the populations on both shores of the Mediterranean. Wouldn't it be otherwise as it had reduced its goals by achieving projects that are surely pertinent but all restrained. Accordingly, it has lost the chance to build a joint project of economic integration. Having concealed its generic discourse, Barcelona 1995 had not tried to identify a strategy of shared growth, responding to the expectations of the South as regards development and employment.

      By giving preference to the restrictive views of the European Union, the UPM opted for the “Union of Projects” instead of identifying “Projects for the Union”. This significant dimensioning of the challenges constituted the Achilles heel of the new-old institution. The scarcity of funding constituted the main obstacle of the UPM. At the present state of affairs, we are facing an institution without ambition nor means, which could not set up its leadership team, nor define its operating mechanism and, lastly, is deprived of a budget. How can we, on the other hand, reconcile the UPM through agreements of association with the policy of neighbourhood, which have privileged the bilateral relations?

This conjuncture of wait and see could be used to incite consultations with a view of checking up the goals and the structures of the institution. While seeing to insure the normal equilibrium between the operators and may be the restructuring applied that would be required by the change in the conjuncture, the partners must take into account the need for a more ambitious new launching of the Euro-Mediterranean strategy. In order to meet the expectations of the populations, we must "think big and act collectively". Such an approach would require closing up the gaps between the points of view North-South and reviewing the asymmetric positions in order to build a real partnership.

Meanwhile, the development of the dialogue 5+5 would permit us to compensate the non operational status of a virtual UPM " just an empty shell" according to some detractors. Wouldn't it be more useful, under these conditions, to give priority, as a first stage, to the development of the Euro Maghreb relations?

Pr. Khalifa Chater